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How Conflict Within the House Impacts a Military
Spouse: An Evaluation of Combat-Related Special
Compensation as a “Marital” Asset
Anthony Cox Jr, Esq.*

I. Introduction
Imagine Hilary Joe marrying Donald Doe. Later, both individuals
later realize the marriage is not in their best interest. As a result, the parties
decide a divorce is proper and need the court’s guidance in determining
the fate of each party’s respective assets. A common sub-issue that arises
from this type of scenario is the issue of which assets the courts will
consider as marital assets, for divorce purpose?
Now imagine that Hilary is a military spouse that began receiving
Combat-Related Special Compensation1 prior to the divorce. CombatRelated Special Compensation is a unique form of monetary compensation
that is reserved for military individuals that are injured in combat. 2
Concisely, it is a statutory benefit that compensates military veterans who
suffered from combat- related injuries.3 How does adding CombatRelated Special Compensation into the mix impact the division of property
phase of Hilary and Donald’s divorce? In fact, this makes the division of
marital property phase of their divorce much more complex because
courts, and particularly the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, have yet to set any precedent regarding the issue of whether
Combat-Related Special Compensation should be considered a marital
asset in the divorce context.
Should Combat-Related Special Compensation be considered a
marital asset in the equitable distribution context? In short, the answer is
yes, based on existing Third Circuit precedent. Part I of this Comment will
shed light for both the Third Circuit and military couples across the
country. Part II will highlight the Third Circuit’s approach to equitable
* J.D., Widener University Commonwealth Law School; B.S., Old Dominion University
1
See 10 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (2016).
2
Id.
3
Id.
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distribution. Part III will evaluate some of the Third Circuit’s precedent of
its evaluation of some of the most common controversial marital assets.
Part IV will provide some background on Combat-Related Special
Compensation. Part V will evaluate Combat-Related Special
Compensation in the equitable distribution context. Part VI will propose a
solution to the Third Circuit regarding this issue, and Part VII will provide
some final thoughts and address how this issue will impact Third Circuit
divorce law moving forward.
A. BACKGROUND ON DIVORCE
Recent studies reveal that divorce rates are consistently
increasing, particularly amongst couples over fifty years old. 4 When a
couple agrees to marry, although the marriage is intended to last “till death
do us part,”5 this is statistically not always the case. In fact, over the past
twenty years, the divorce rate amongst couples over fifty-years old
commonly referred to as “gray divorces,”6 has doubled.7 As many
individuals who receive Combat-Related Special Compensation are
around fifty-years of age, 8 this “gray divorce” statistic is critical for the
issue at hand. There needs to be critical background information with
respect to evaluating this issue.
It is important to be aware of some common scenarios that result in
a “gray divorce” because gray divorces are those that are likely to result in
a dispute over Combat-Related Special Compensation. These scenarios
include: an emotional disconnection between the couple, the couples’
children moving out of the household, a desire to pursue self-fulfillment,
changes in financial circumstances, and adultery. 9
Now that a foundation has been set as to divorce, assume that the
reason Hilary and Donald have decided to get a divorce is because the two
recently experienced an emotional disconnect in their relationship.
Legally, what is the next step for both Hilary and Donald? Generally
speaking, both parties would seek some form of alternative dispute
resolution in order to evaluate their decision to divorce and any related

4

Arlene G. Dubin & Rebecca A. Provder, The Gray Divorce Phenomenon, NEW YORK LAW
JOURNAL, July 25, 2016.
5
Id.
6
The term “gray divorce” is a term commonly used in the family law context to refer to a
divorce that consists of a couple where both parties are above fifty-years old. The term was
created to correspond with the fact that it is common for men and woman above fifty years
of age to develop gray hair. Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
DUBIN & PROVDER, supra note 4.
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legal issues.10 Mediation is the most common method of alternative
dispute resolution.11 This is the preferred method in divorce proceedings
because its relaxed environment and process compliments the emotional
aspect of divorce proceedings. 12 Historically speaking, divorce
proceedings were handled in court. However, this changed over time, as
parties were not satisfied with the “win-lose” atmosphere that occurs in
traditional court proceedings.13
Divorce mediations consist of a third party, typically a licensed
family law practitioner, 14 who serves as a moderator for the parties
involved in the dispute. While the third party does not have any impact on
the result of the dispute, he or she strives to counsel both parties to reach
a decision that is favorable to their needs and goals.15 There are five
common mediation models that mediators exercise: the facilitative model,
the transformative model, the evaluative model, the technique of reality
testing model, and the eleventh-hour divorce facilitation model.16
i. Facilitative Model
The first method that mediators use in divorce disputes is the
facilitative model.17 The goal of the facilitative model is to create an
environment that enables the parties to reach a mutually agreeable
decision.18 Under the facilitative model, the mediator requires the parties
to brainstorm and analyze potential solutions to their problems
collaboratively.
ii. Transformative Model
The second method that mediators use in divorce disputes is the
transformative model. The goal of the transformative model is to enable
the parties to “recognize the interests, needs, and values of the other
party.”19 Specifically, the goal is to transform the relationship to a point

10

Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241 (2008).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 245.
14
Divorce lawyers are the only individuals allowed to serve as the neutral party in divorce
mediation because they are best equipped to deal with the emotional aspect. Id. at 242.
15
Id. at 244.
16
Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241, 246 (2008).
17
Id. at 247.
18
Id.
19
Id.
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where the parties can recognize the needs of the other and understand each
other more fluently.20
iii. Evaluative Model
The third method utilized by mediators in divorce disputes is the
evaluative model. 21 This model is most parallels to traditional litigation,
as it is the model where the mediator takes the most active role. 22 The
unique thing about the evaluative model is unlike the first two models; it
requires the mediator to provide each party with their individual analysis
and advice on the respective issues surrounding the divorce.23 The goal of
this method is to give the parties with a snippet of how a trial judge would
decide their respective legal issues 24 Specifically, this method strives to
have the parties focus to find a mutually favorable decision, knowing that
a trial judge may issue an unfavorable decision for one of the parties. 25
iv. Technique of Reality Testing Model
The fourth method used by mediators in divorce disputes is the
technique of reality testing model. This method is very popular; it is
generally exercised when the parties are having an issue in reaching a
solution.26 This method consists of the mediator openly informing the
parties of how a court is likely to decide on their differences. 27 This is
commonly referred to as the “wake-up call” method, as it strives to force
the parties to face reality.28
v. Eleventh Hour Divorce Facilitation Model
The fifth method used by mediators is the eleventh-hour divorce
facilitation model. 29 This method is unique because unlike the other four
methods that are used at the beginning of the dispute; this method is not
used until the trial date begins approaching. 30 The goal of this method is
not to prevent a trial; instead, it strives to provide parties with a different
20

Id.
Id. at 248.
22
Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241,248 (2008).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 249.
28
Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation: Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial
Lawyers, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICTS RESOL. 241, 249 (2008).
29
Id.
30
Id.
21
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perspective to increase the probability of the parties reaching a mutual
decision at or before trial.31
B. LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM DIVORCE
Now that Hilary and Donald have chosen a method for mediation, it
is important to evaluate some of the potential legal issues that may arise
for the couple. The most common issues that arise from divorce include
child custody, child support, and the division of the marital property. 32
i. Child Custody
Assuming Hilary and Donald have children at the time they decide
to divorce, they will face child custody issues. In assessing this issue,
courts attempt to make a custody decision that is in the best interest of the
children. 33 With the best interest of the children being the primary
influence on a courts’ decision regarding custody issues, there are four
types of custody awards that courts can grant.34 Those four types of
custody include the following: sole custody, joint custody, divided
custody, and split custody.35 A court can award either sole legal custody
or sole physical custody. 36 If a court awards sole legal custody, the
custodial parent 37 maintains the legal rights regarding the children. 38 On
the other hand, in a sole physical custody situation, the non-custodial
parent39 maintains limited rights and access to the children. 40 If a court
awards sole physical custody, then the custodial parent maintains primary
custody of the child, while the non-custodial parent is generally only
entitled to visitation.41
Courts can award joint legal custody or joint physical custody. 42 If a
court awards joint legal custody both parents retain the right to make

31

Id.
DUBIN & PROVDER, supra note 4.
33
Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 1988, at
123.
34
Id. at 124.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
The custodial parent is the parent who is given physical custody by a court order or the
parent that the child is physically with for a majority of the time. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
38
JOAN B. KELLY, supra note 33.
39
The non-custodial parent is the parent who does not have physical custody or the parent
that the child is not physically with for a majority of the time. BLACK’S LAW, supra note
37.
40
JOAN B. KELLY, supra note 33.
41
Id.
42
Id.
32
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decisions regarding the health and welfare of the children. 43 In contrast, if
a court awards joint physical custody, the right to exercise residential care
is granted to both parents. The day-to-day schedule for the child is left to
the discretion of the parents. 44 The final two common types of custody are
divided custody and split custody.45 For divided custody, each parent
maintains equal legal rights and will alternate physical custody.46 Split
custody gives each parent both sole legal and physical custody, it
continues to be the most popular type of custody. 47 This is because courts
generally find joint custody to be in the best interest of the child to have
equal access to both parents.48
ii. Child Support
Child support is another issue that will likely challenge Hilary and
Donald. Traditionally, child support has been defined as “cash
contributions made on behalf of a minor child pursuant to a court order or
an agreement between the parents.”49 Before a court can award child
support, it is important that one prerequisite is established. 50 Specifically,
the party requesting child support has the burden of demonstrating that the
opposing party is the biological parent of the child or has a relationship
with the child to the extent where granting child support would be
justified. 51 Assuming that the party requesting child support can meet this
prerequisite, the court will assess general child support guidelines to
determine the amount of child support it will award.52 Income is the
primary factor that courts use to consider the amount of child support that
it will award.53 As a result, the amount of child support that either Hilary
or Donald would be entitled to would hinge upon the court’s income
analysis.54

43

Id.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 1988, at
124.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Establishment of Child Support Obligations, Essentials for Attorneys in Children.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
A child support income analysis requires courts to evaluate a spouse’s net income and
the number of children involved. While the percentage of child support generally does
not change, it is scaled based on the spouse’s net income and the number of children
involved. Jane Venohr, Review of the Pennsylvania Child Support Guidelines,
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, March 30, 2012.
44
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iii. Division of Marital Property
Now it is time for Hilary and Donald to decide what legally will
happen to the couples’ property. This issue will depend upon the approach
that Donald and Hilary’s jurisdiction follows regarding the division of
marital property.
C. APPROACHES USED TO DIVIDE MARITAL ISSUES
There are three distinct approaches governing this issue: Community
Property, Separate Property, and Equitable Distribution.55 For the sake of
brevity, this Comment will only discuss Community Property and
Equitable Distribution, as these are the only approaches employed by the
Third Circuit.56
i. Community Property Approach
The first approach that is used to address this issue is the Community
Property Approach. 57 The majority of the Community Property states are
west coast states including Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. 58 In a community property
jurisdiction, spouses have an equal interest in all income and assets that
are acquired during the marriage.59 In reference to any property that is
acquired prior to the marriage, each party only maintains an interest in its
respective income and assets.60 Therefore, if Hilary and Donald divorce in
a community property state, whether Hilary’s Combat Special Relation
Compensation would be a marital asset at the time of marriage would
hinge upon whether Hilary acquired rights to Combat Related Special
Compensation prior to or during the marriage.
ii. Equitable Distribution Approach
The next approach used in distributing marital property is the
equitable distribution approach.61 Equitable distribution jurisdictions view
marriage as a partnership. Therefore, the primary goal of equitable
distribution is to divide the property justly and fairly, while distributing
the property without regard to the party that holds legal title to the piece

55

Benjamin Ellis, Protecting the Right to Marital Property, CARDOZA L. REV. 30:4 (2009).
Id.
57
James R. Ratner, Distribution of Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions:
Equitable Doesn’t Equal, 72 LA. L. REV. 21.
58
Id.at 21 n.1
59
Id. at 22.
60
Id.
61
Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4TH 481.
56
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of property or asset.62 Equitable distribution focuses on distributing the
property in a manner that creates the most just and fair result. 63 This is why
unlike the other approaches; the equitable distribution approach
recognizes both a party’s economic and noneconomic contributions, in
order to ensure a fair result.64 While the analysis regarding equitable
distribution is state specific and governed by statutory law, each state’s
law strives to achieve the same goals described above. 65 For purposes of
this Comment, assume that Hilary and Donald are residents of any Third
Circuit jurisdiction, other than the Virgin Islands. Therefore, equitable
distribution law will govern whether Hilary’s Combat Related Special
Compensation should be considered a marital asset with respect to Donald
and Hilary’s divorce.

II. The Third Circuit’s Approach: Relevant Law
As the Third Circuit is made up of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New
Jersey, and the Virgin Islands, 66 this section will address each of these
respective laws regarding the process of dividing marital property. The
Virgin Island’s law will not be discussed in detail, as it is the only Third
Circuit territory and is not an equitable distribution jurisdiction.
A. PENNSYLVANIA
In Pennsylvania, the Section 3501 four-step analysis governs this
issue.67 First, Pennsylvania courts determine whether the asset in dispute
is to be considered property. 68 Second, if the asset is considered to be
property, the courts then consider if the asset is “marital” property
pursuant to Section 3501.69 Third, the court will value the asset. Finally,
the courts will divide the asset. 70
The first step of the analysis under Pennsylvania law is to determine
whether the asset involved is property, which is governed by the basic
principles Pennsylvania property law.71 Concerning real property, this step
of the analysis is presumed. 72 On the other hand, Pennsylvania has not set
62

Id. at *2.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
THIRD CIRCUIT COURTS, http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/third-circuit-courts.
67
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3501(a).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at (b).
63
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a bright-line rule for intangible property. Pennsylvania’s analysis
regarding some of the most controversial intangible property will be
discussed in a later section.
If the court determines that there is property involved in the divorce,
then the next step is determining if the asset is “marital” property.
Subsection (a) of Section 3501 governs this issue. Pursuant to subsection
(a), marital property consists of all property acquired by either party during
the marriage and any increases in the value of all other property during
marriage.73 On the other hand, marital property does not consist of the
following:
[P]roperty acquired prior to marriage or property acquired in
exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage; property
excluded by valid agreement of the parties into before, during or
after marriage; property acquired by gift; 74property acquired after
final separation until the date of divorce, except for property
acquired in exchange for marital assets; property which a party has
sold, granted, conveyed or otherwise disposed of in good faith and
for value prior to the date of final separation, veteran’s benefits
exempt from attachment, levy or seizure pursuant to act of
September 2, 1958; property to the extent to which the property
has been mortgaged or otherwise encumbered in good faith for
value prior to the date of final separation; and any payment
received as a result of an award or settlement for any cause of
action or claim which accrued prior to the marriage or after the
date of final separation regardless of when the payment was
received.75

Because statutory law governs this section, Pennsylvania courts rely solely
on the statute in determining if the asset at issue is marital property.
If a Pennsylvania court finds an asset as marital pursuant to Section
3501, it then proceeds to the next step of the analysis; valuing the property.
In determining the value of a marital asset, Pennsylvania courts uses the
present division approach.76 According to the present division approach,
the determination as to the value is made at the time of trial. 77 The courts
rely on valuation experts to provide an expert opinion as to the value of
the asset in dispute at the time of trial.78 Although the final decision

73

Id. at (a).
It is important to note that this excludes property acquired by bequest, devise, descent, or
property acquired in exchange for such property. See 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3501(a)(3).
75
Id. at (a)(1)-(4).
76
22 P.L.E. Divorce § 212 (2017).
77
Id.
78
Id.
74
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regarding value is at the court’s discretion, courts commonly give great
deference to valuation experts.79
The final step of the analysis requires the court to divide the property;
section 3502 governs this issue.80 Section 3502 provides the court with a
plethora of factors to utilize when analyzing the proper manner to divide
the property.81 While each factor assesses something slightly different,
they all evaluate each party’s economic and non-economic contribution to
the marriage. 82 Contribution, both economic and non-economic, is an
essential principle used by Pennsylvania family law courts when
determining exactly how to divide the property.
B. DELAWARE
Regarding Delaware’s approach to dividing marital property, uses
Section 1513.83 Like Pennsylvania, Delaware’s governing statute details a
four-step process.
First, Delaware courts begin by determining if the asset is considered
property in the divorce context.84 Unlike Pennsylvania, Delaware does not
provide much guidance as to which assets should be considered property,
giving complete deference to the plain language of the statute. 85 As a
result, Delaware courts theoretically begin with the second step of the
analysis, which is to determine if the asset at issue is a marital asset. 86
Pursuant to Section 1513, marital property includes both property acquired
by either party subsequent to the marriage87 and all property that is jointly
titled real property88 acquired prior to the marriage.89

79

Id.
23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3502 (2016).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (2016).
84
Id.
85
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (2016).
86
Id.
87
It is important to know that there are four exceptions to this general rule. Those four
exceptions include the following: (1) Property acquired by an individual spouse by
bequest, devise, or descent or by gift, except gifts between spouses, provided the gifted
property is titled and maintained in the sole name of the done spouse, or a gift tax return
is filed reporting the transfer of the gifted property in the sole name of the done spouse or
a notarized document, executed before or contemporaneously with the transfer, is offered
to demonstrate the nature of the transfer; (2) Property acquired in exchange for property
acquired prior to the marriage; (3) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(4) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
88
In this context, jointly titled property includes joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and
any other form of co-ownership.
89
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (2016).
80

2018]

Conflict Impacts Military Spouse

11

Assuming the asset at issue meets the statutory definition of “marital
property,” the courts proceed to determine how the property should be
valued. In Sayer v. Sayer, a case from the Supreme Court of Delaware,
Justice Moore provides some insight as to how Delaware courts value
marital assets.90 According to Sayer, Delaware courts use the present value
of the asset in dispute. 91 The court assigns a monetary value to each asset
in dispute, sometimes relying on testimony from financial professionals. 92
The final step of the analysis is the actual division of the asset(s).
Subsection (a) of Section 1513 governs this segment of the analysis. 93
Subsection (a) details eleven factors for courts to evaluate in determining
exactly how to divide the assets involved. Those factors include the
following:
(1) [t]he length of the marriage; (2) Any prior marriage of the
party; (3) [t]he age, health, station, amount and sources of income,
(4)vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of
each of the parties; (5) [w]hether the property award is in lieu of
or in addition to alimony; (6) [t]he opportunity of each for future
acquisitions of capital assets and income; (7) [t]he contribution or
dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the
contribution of a party as homemaker, husband, or wife; (8) [t]he
value of the property set apart to each party; (9) [t]he economic
circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is
to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the
family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to
the party with whom any children of the marriage will live; (10)
[w]hether the property was acquired by gift, except those gifts
excluded by paragraph (b)(1) of this section; (11) [t]he debts of the
parties; and [t]ax consequences. 94

Delaware courts weigh these factors to determine the proper method of
division.
C. NEW JERSEY
New Jersey assesses equitable distribution claims liberally,
evidenced by N.J. Stat. § 2A:34-31.1.95 Pursuant to the statute, New Jersey
relies solely on sixteen factors in determining how to divide the property. 96
90

Sayer v. Sayer, 492 A.2d 238 (Del. 1985).
Id.
92
Id.
93
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (2016).
94
Id.
95
N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:34-23.1 (2016).
96
Id.
91
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Although the substance of each factor differs, a common theme is that each
factor assesses each party’s economic and non-economic contribution to
the asset in dispute. As a result, it is evident that this is the primary focus
of New Jersey courts is each party’s contribution to the asset at issue.97
D. VIRGIN ISLANDS
Unlike the other three jurisdictions in the Third Circuit, the Virgin
Islands are the only jurisdiction that do not utilize the equitable distribution
approach. The Virgin Islands exercises a community property approach.
This Comment will not detail the community property approach, as this
approach was discussed earlier.

III. The Third’s Circuit’s Approach: Controversial
“Marital” Assets
This section of the Comment will evaluate some of the more
controversial assets, similar to Combat-Related Special Compensation and
determine whether each Third Circuit jurisdiction, excluding the Virgin
Islands, considers it to be a marital asset in the divorce context. The section
evaluates pensions, disability, and military retirement pay.
A. PENSIONS
A pension is a type of retirement plan. 98 In particular, a pension is a
fund managed by an employer that is awarded to an employee at the time
of his or her retirement under circumstances when the employee meets the
necessary length of employment requirements needed to obtain a
pension.99 There are two categories of pensions: vested and unvested
pensions.100 A vested pension is when employee is currently entitled to at
the time of divorce, an unvested pension is a pension that an employee is
not currently entitled to at the time of divorce. 101
i. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, it is well-established law that a pension, whether
vested or unvested, is a marital asset in a divorce. 102 In Braderman v.
Braderman, a case from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Judge
97

Id.
2-23 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property § 23.02 (2015).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Flynn v. Flynn, 341 Pa. Super. 76, 491 A.2d 156 (1985).
98
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Monttemuro addressed this issue in greater detail. 103 Braderman involved
a husband and wife who decided to divorce. The court had to decide
whether the husband’s pension. 104 In assessing this issue, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania relied on case law from other jurisdictions, 105 which
had not been addressed in Pennsylvania prior to Braderman.106
Specifically, the Braderman court relied on case law from one of its sister
circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.107 In
ruling that a pension is always a marital asset at the time of marriage, the
Seventh Circuit relied on its precedent that retirement benefits are marital
assets because of the non-economic contribution that goes into assisting a
spouse secure retirement benefits.108 The Braderman court adopted this
rationale; therefore holding that the husband’s pension, and pensions in
general, are marital assets in divorce disputes.109 Post Braderman, it is
evident that pensions are marital assets in the state of Pennsylvania.
ii. Delaware
In Delaware, a pension is a marital asset in divorce disputes. 110 In
Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a
pension that vests during the marriage is a marital asset in a divorce,
primarily because holding on the contrary would be inconsistent with the
basic principles of the equitable distribution doctrine. 111 Precisely, one of
the primary purposes of the equitable distribution is to divide the properly
fairly. 112 As a result, the Robert court held that it would be fundamentally
unfair to not entitle a non-employee spouse to a pension that vested, while
the parties were married.113
The issue of whether an unvested pension is a marital asset in the
divorce context, the Robert court relied on California case law in reaching
its decision. 114 The Supreme Court of California held in In re Marriage of
Brown that an unvested pension is deemed a marital asset. 115 The Brown
court provided that since a pension is a form of property and a right to
property is contractual, a non-employee spouse obtains rights to unvested
103

Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa. Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985).
Id.
105
Id. at 619.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. (citing 442 N.E. 2d 556).
109
Id.
110
Robert C.S. v. Barbara J.S., 434 A.2d 383 (Del. 1981).
111
Id. at 386.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976).
104
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pensions when entering into a marital contract with an employee spouse. 116
Despite California being a community property state, the Robert court
adopted the holding and rationale derived from Brown.117 Currently, it is
undisputed that both vested and unvested pensions are marital assets in the
state of Delaware.118
iii. New Jersey
In New Jersey, “a pension that is legally or beneficially acquired
during the marriage is subject to equitable distribution.”119 The Superior
Court of New Jersey in Sternesky v. Salice-Sternesky addressed this
issue.120 The Sternesk Court focused its analysis on the contribution that
a non-employee spouse makes to an employee spouse obtaining a
pension.121 The court held that “[b]ecause both spouses contribute to the
earning of pension, both justifiably expect to share the future enjoyment
of the pension benefit.”122 As a result, all of the contribution made to
pensions in New Jersey, the court deemed a pension a marital asset. 123
B. DISABILITY INCOME
It is not uncommon for a spouse to be entitled to disability income.
Disability income serves three primary purposes. 124 First, disability
income tends to compensate for the loss of earnings resulting from
compelled premature retirement and from a diminished ability to compete
in the employment market.125 Second, disability income strives to
compensate the disabled person for suffering caused by the disability.
Finally, disability income intends to replace a retirement pension by
providing support for the disabled worker after he leaves his job. 126
i. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, whether a disability is a marital asset in the divorce
hinges upon when the right to receive disability payment arises.127 Judge
Bender of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania shed light on this issue in
116

Id.
Robert C.S., 434 A.2d at 383.
118
Id.
119
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Yuhas v. Yuhas.128 Yuhas involved a wife who was asserting that her
husband’s disability income policy was a marital asset pursuant to
Pennsylvania case law.129 Prior to the parties’ agreeing to separate, the
husband suffered a traumatic injury resulting in disability income. 130 The
court held that this issue hinged upon whether the husband’s right to seek
compensation of the disability income accrued during the marriage. 131
Relying on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Drake v.
Drake,132 the Yuhas court held that assessing this issue requires the
determination of when the husband obtained a legal right to the disability
income. 133 In applying this standard to its specific case, the court denied
the wife’s request, ultimately holding that the husband’s disability is not
to be considered a marital asset because he did not obtain a legal right to
the disability income until subsequent the marriage. 134 Yuhas makes it
clear that disability income remains a controversial “marital” asset in
Pennsylvania. It does set a clear standard to utilize in an equitable
distribution analysis in determining if a spouse’s disability in dispute is to
be considered a marital asset.135
ii. Delaware
While Delaware has yet to adopt a clear rule on this issue, the Family
Court of Delaware made it clear that it will decide this issue on a case-bycase basis.136 The court specified that it would base its holding, when
disability income is in dispute, on the amount of contribution both
economic and non-economic contribution, which the party asserting
disability income as a marital asset can demonstrate. 137Armstrong v.
Armstrong, a 1994 case from the Delaware Family court, illustrates as to
how Delaware courts approach this issue. Armstrong involved a wife that
was diagnosed with Lupus Erythematosus. 138
In Armstrong, the wife began receiving disability income. At this
time, the husband asserted that he agreed to become a “house husband,”
and take care of all of the household duties, while the wife handled all of
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the financial burdens using her disability income. 139 Subsequently, the
parties decided to divorce and a dispute arose as to whether the wife’s
disability income should be considered a marital asset within the
marriage.140 The court’s analysis hinged upon the husband’s contribution
to the wife receiving her disability income. 141 The court held that the
husband did not contribute at all, as he did not become a “house husband”
until after the wife received her disability income. 142 While this case does
not set a bright-line rule for the state of Delaware, it does specify that
Delaware courts base its analysis, in evaluating the eligibility of disability
income in the equitable distribution context, on the amount of contribution
by the party not compensated by the disability income. 143
iii. New Jersey
New Jersey takes an interesting approach regarding this issue. It is
unique that New Jersey courts focus its analysis on the amount of the
disability income that is eligible for division rather than whether disability
income itself is eligible. 144 The Superior Court of New Jersey illustrates as
to how New Jersey courts evaluate this issue in Avallone v. Avallone.145
Avallone, involved a wife claiming that she was entitled to her husband’s
disability income in the equitable distribution segment of their divorce
dispute. 146 While the husband contended that this issue should hinge upon
the age of the disability income, the Superior Court of New Jersey
disagreed. 147 The court held that this approach is inconsistent with the
fundamental principle of fairness that underlies the doctrine of equitable
distribution. 148 Furthermore, the court held that disability income could
serve as a significant joint financial asset within a marriage. 149 The court
ultimately held that while it will always consider disability income as a
marital asset in equitable distribution disputes, it would evaluate the
economic and non-economic contribution made by the party asserting its
right to entitlement to determine the amount that is eligible for division. 150
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C. MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY
Military retirement pay is a common asset involved in a divorce
dispute. Military retirement pay is a federal benefit available to members
of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and the Coast Guard. 151 To
become eligible for military retirement pay, an individual must remain on
active duty or serve in the reserves for the aforementioned military
branches for a minimum of twenty years. 152
i. Pennsylvania
Pursuant to Pennsylvania jurisprudence, military retirement pay is a
marital asset in the divorce context. 153 In Wagner v. Wagner, a case from
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Justice Cappy held that military
retirement pay is a marital asset in Pennsylvania, so long as the military
spouse is subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.154 The court relied on the
language of Section 1408(c)(4) of the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses’ Protection Act.155 Although this generally would be an issue
governed by federal law, pursuant to Section 1408:
A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of a member in
the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has
jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other
than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court. 156

As the Wagner court relied on the plain language of Section 1408 in
determining if military retirement pay is a marital asset in the divorce
context, its analysis hinged upon whether the husband, the military spouse,
was subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. 157 In fact, post-Wagner this
issue hinges solely upon whether a military spouse is subject to jurisdiction
in a state hearing the marital dispute.
ii. Delaware
Under Delaware law, military retirement pay is a marital asset in the
divorce context.158 Delaware adopted an analysis parallel to Pennsylvania,
151
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holding that the plain language of Section 1408 gives state family law
courts the discretion to consider military retirement pay as a marital
asset.159
iii. New Jersey
New Jersey courts consider military retirement pay analogous to a
pension, therefore holding it as a marital asset in the divorce context. 160
Specifically, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Kruger v. Kruger,
addressed the question of whether military retirement pay is a marital asset
in the equitable distribution context. 161 Kruger involved a husband and
wife that decided to divorce as a result of a marital disconnect. 162 At the
equitable distribution stage of the divorce, the wife asserted that she was
entitled to her husband’s military retirement pay.163 The Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the wife was entitled to her husband’s military
retirement pay. 164 The court rationed that when a military spouse receives
military retirement pay, it hinges upon the number of years he or she
engaged in service, it should be treated analogously to a pension. 165 As a
result, the court applied its precedent regarding pensions and set a concrete
rule with respect to the eligibility of military retirement pay.166

IV. Combat-Related Special Compensation
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In December of 2002, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. § 1413(a), the
statute governing Combat-Related Special Compensation.167 Congress
created a form of special compensation to mitigate the loss of income that
military individuals who suffer disabilities might experience. 168 Before the
enactment of this statute, there was a prohibition against concurrent receipt
of disability from both the Department of Defense and the Veteran Affairs,
the two organizations responsible for providing the majority of military
disability compensation. 169 Particularly Congress did not want military
159
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individuals to be eligible for “duplicate” benefits, as a result of one
disability.170 In 2002, however, Congress created this concept of CombatRelated Special Compensation to make up for some of this loss of
income. 171
B. DISSECTING COMBAT-RELATED SPECIAL COMPENSATION
Section 1413(c) governs the eligibility requirements for receiving
Combat Related Special Compensation benefits. 172 Under the statute, a
military individual is eligible for these benefits if (1) they are entitled to
retired pay by law and (2) has a combat-related special disability. 173
Concerning the first requirement, a military individual is eligible for
retired pay when they have at least twenty years of service in their
respective branch. Section 1413(e) provides some insight on the second
requirement. 174According to this section, a combat-related disability
includes those disabilities that are attributable to an injury for which the
member was awarded a Purple Heart.175 Also, it refers to disabilities that
occur: as a direct result of armed conflict; while engaged in hazardous
service; in the performance of duty under conditions simulating war; or
through an instrumentality of war.176 It is important to note, however, that
in 2008 Congress expanded the scope of eligibility to now include those
individuals who have retired for disability, resulting in the inclusion of all
individuals who were retired from military service regardless of the
number of years the individual served prior to retirement. 177
Now let’s assume that Hilary, a military spouse, has been deemed
eligible for Combat- Related Special Compensation and begins to receive
it. As she and Donald are now at the equitable distribution stage of the
divorce, it is time for the two to decide which assets, including Hilary’s
Combat-Related Special Compensation, are eligible to divide. Should
Hilary’s Combat-Related Special Compensation be eligible? In short, the
answer is yes pursuant to the relevant Third Circuit precedent.
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V. An Evaluation of Combat-Related Special
Compensation in Relation to other Controversial
Assets
The Third Circuit has yet to decide whether Combat-Related Special
Compensation should be considered a marital asset. When they do,
however, there will be many issues to consider. It will be important for the
Third Circuit to evaluate the three most important problems that its
precedent indicates are most important when deciding which assets are
marital. First, courts must consider the nature of Combat-Related Special
Compensation about some of the other controversial intangible marital
assets. Second, courts must consider the nature of non-economic
contribution that a non-military spouse dedicates to a military spouse.
Finally, courts must consider basic principles of fundamental fairness. In
assessing these three factors, it is evident that there are compelling
arguments both for and against deeming Combat-Related Special
Compensation as a marital asset and the contrary.
A. ACCEPTING COMBAT-RELATED SPECIAL COMPENSATION AS A
MARITAL ASSET
The first compelling argument is recognition of the similarities
between Combat-Related Special Compensation and some of the other
common assets such as pensions, disability income, and military
retirement pay. First, like both pensions and military retirement pay,
eligibility for Combat-Related Special Compensation hinges at least
partially on the length of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Kruger illustrates the role that similarities in eligibility requirements
play in this analysis when it made its decision to deem military retirement
pay a marital asset solely because of how its eligibility requirements
compared to those of a pension. 178 The Kruger court held that military
retirement pay should be treated consistent with pensions because like a
pension, eligibility of military retirement pay hinges upon length of
employment. 179
Moreover, like pensions, disability income, and military retirement
pay, Combat-Related Special Compensation is a monetary asset. This is
critical, as the Third Circuit seems to treat most monetary assets similarly.
This is because not entitling spouses to at least a portion of each other’s
respective money would contradict the purpose underlying equitable
178
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distribution, ensuring a fair division of property. Therefore, the Third
Circuit has repeatedly treated all monetary assets equivalently to remain
consistent with the purposes of equitable distribution.
The second argument in support of Combat-Related Special
Compensation being accepted as a marital asset is the nature of
contribution that a non-military spouse provides a military spouse. On the
contribution factor, the analysis turns upon whether one finds a broader or
narrow approach more appropriate. In accepting Combat-Related Special
Compensation, courts would use a broad approach to non-economic
contribution. Precisely, these courts would place the primary focus on a
non-military spouse’s contribution to a military spouse’s career rather than
the non-military spouse’s contribution to the actual asset, Combat-Related
Special Compensation, in dispute.
In using a broader approach, the question before the court is does a
non-military spouse contribute to a military spouse’s military career? The
question at issue requires courts to evaluate the nature of non-economic
contribution that a non-military spouse dedicates to a military spouses’
military career. In sum, the nature of the non-economic contribution that
non-military spouse contributes to a military spouse’s military career is
significant. For example, a non-military spouse dedicates emotional
support to the military spouse, maintains the household, and serves as the
primary caretaker for the children, assuming the couple has any.
A non-military spouse dedicates a plethora of emotional support to
his or her non-military spouse. As a military career generally entails being
away from family for an extended period, it is almost required for a nonmilitary spouse to provide emotional support to his or her respective
spouse. Let us use our Hilary and Donald Doe hypothetical to illustrate
this emotional support. Assume that Hilary is away from his family during
the holiday season due to combat-related military duties. Donald is likely
calling Hilary and providing her with some emotional support, as she is
unable to be at home with the family during the holiday season.
Second, a non-military spouse assists the military spouse in handling
responsibilities regarding the children. For example, let us assume that
Hilary is deployed to Italy for a year due to combat-related military duties.
Because of the lengthy deployment, in this instance, Donald would be
responsible for handling the duties involving the children. For instance,
Donald would be required to ensure that the children got to school in a
timely fashion and give parental guidance on homework.
Additionally, a non-military spouse assists the military spouse in
maintaining the household. For example, if Hilary is away for military
combat, then Donald will be responsible for ensuring that the house is
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functioning property. In sum, it is evident that there is an abundance of
non-economic contribution dedicated by non-military spouse.
The third argument in support of Combat-Related Special
Compensation being accepted as a marital asset, is the basic principle of
fairness; an essential concept used when exercising equitable distribution.
Because of the nature of the non-economic contribution that a non-military
spouse dedicates to a military spouse and the nature of military
relationships, it would be unjust to not entitle the non-military spouse to
at least a portion of the compensation. A military career requires a nonmilitary spouse to travel constantly and spend long periods of time without
being in the physical presence of his or her spouse, placing an emotional
burden on non-military spouses. Despite this emotional burden, nonmilitary spouses continue to support their military spouse in every aspect
possible and ensure that their respective spouse has a successful military
career.
B. REFUSING COMBAT-RELATED SPECIAL COMPENSATION AS A
MARITAL ASSET
The first compelling argument in support of refusing CombatRelated Special Compensation as a marital asset is recognition of the
differences between Combat-Related Special Compensation and the assets
that the Third Circuit has already considered marital. Although obtaining
Combat-Related Special Compensation centers partially on a length of
employment. 180 Those who assert that Combat-Related Special
Compensation is similar to some of the other controversial assets ignore
this fact, as they inaccurately rely on the length of employment as the only
criterion.
The second argument in support of refusing Combat-Related Special
Compensation as a marital asset is the lack of non-economic contribution
by the non-military spouse’s contribution to the military spouse’s CombatRelated Special Compensation itself. In refusing Combat-Related Special
Compensation as a military asset, courts would have to dismiss a broad
approach and evaluate the nature of non-economic contribution much
more narrowly. In doing so, the nature of non-economic contribution
would be minimal, as the non-military spouse does not directly fight in
combat or serve for the military spouse.
The third and final argument in support of refusing Combat-Related
Special Compensation as a marital asset is the principle of fundamental
180
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fairness. If the court wanted to reject Combat-Related Special
Compensation as a marital asset, it would need to construe the principle of
fundamental fairness in favor of the military spouse. Therefore, the
argument is that it is fundamentally unfair to award a non-military spouse
for all the physical stress that accompanies the military spouse as a result
of engaging in combat.

VI. A Proposed Solution for the Third Circuit
Although there are compelling arguments both for accepting and
refusing Combat-Related Special Compensation as a marital asset, the
majority of the precedent from Third Circuit jurisdictions supports the idea
of holding Combat-Related Special Compensation as a marital asset in the
equitable distribution context.
Beginning with the nature of Combat-Related Special Compensation
in comparison to other marital assets within the marital assets, the
similarities drastically outweigh the differences. Combat-Related Special
Compensation is a monetary asset that derives from the length of
employment like pensions, disability income, and military retirement pay.
Although, the requirements to acquire Combat-Related Special
Compensation might be slightly more extensive than the three other assets,
that alone has never been enough for the Third Circuit to treat two assets
differently. In Kruger, the Supreme Court of New Jersey supported this
proposition. Further, the Kruger courter-rejected the argument that
military retirement pay should not be treated analogously to pensions
merely because the requirements to acquire military retirement pay are
more enhanced than those needed to acquire a pension. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey instead held that the two assets both resting at least
partially on the length of employment was enough to treat the two
similarly. As a result, the arguments accepting Combat-Related Special
Compensation as a marital asset due to its similarities to other marital
assets are more consistent with precedent, therefore more compelling than
any opposition.
Additionally, the non-economic contribution that a non-military
spouse provides to a military spouse’s military career supports CombatRelated Special Compensation being accepted as a marital asset. While
scholars in favor of rejecting Combat-Related Compensation as a marital
asset will assert that a narrower approach to evaluating non-economic
contribution should be accepted, this approach must be rejected because it
is completely inconsistent with fundamental fairness, the primary
principle underlying the Third Circuit’s equitable distribution analysis. A
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narrow approach would require the courts to overlook a non-military
spouse’s contribution to the military spouse’s military career. This would
be completely unfair as a military spouse is unable to have a successful
enough career to achieve eligibility for Combat-Related Special
Compensation, if injured, without the support from his or her spouse. As
a result, a broader approach is more consistent with the Third Circuit’s
precedent. Therefore, supporting the proposition that Combat-Related
Special Compensation should be accepted as a marital asset.
In sum, it is proper for all the equitable distribution states in the Third
Circuit, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey, to adopt a rule
consistent with such. The Third Circuit, however, should not award a nonmilitary spouse who is acting in bad-faith when asserting marital rights to
a military spouse’s Combat-Related Special Compensation. Therefore,
each Third Circuit equitable distribution jurisdiction should adopt a
holding that Combat-Related Special Compensation is a marital asset in
all instances. The exception to this rule should be when the military spouse
demonstrate that the non-military spouse has not dedicated any noneconomic contribution to his or her military career. This will enable courts
to prevent non-military spouses from acting in bad-faith. Specifically, it
prevents a non-military spouse from asserting a right to an asset when he
or she did not contribute to the military spouse’s military career. It would
then be up to the court to determine whether the military spouse has met
his or her burden.

VII: Conclusion
As we have seen, Third Circuit jurisdictions are very liberal in
deciding which assets should be considered marital assets in the equitable
distribution context. A decision to deem Combat-Related Special
Compensation as a marital asset will likely not lead to the Third Circuit
disregarding its liberal precedent. This decision, however, would likely
create some uproar in military communities. A decision to deem CombatRelated Special Compensation as a martial asset would likely result in
dissatisfaction with the law amongst the military community because of
the personalized nature of military assets such as Combat-Related Special
Compensation. Military individuals tend to take extensive pride in their
military achievements and assets because of all the labor and dedication
needed to have a successful military career; therefore, military spouses are
likely to reluctant to share a military asset with his or her spouse.
Although much respect and honor should be given to military
spouses, a rule contrary to the one proposed in this Comment would be
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inconsistent with Third Circuit Precedent. If the Third Circuit adopts this
rule, it would illustrate how serious the Third Circuit is in remaining
consistent with the principles underlying equitable distribution. As this is
what the Third Circuit has traditionally done, it should accept CombatRelated Special Compensation as a marital asset in the equitable
distribution context.

